Nahmanides: Law and Mysticism
by Moshe Halbertal [Translated by Daniel Tabak] (Yale University Press, 2020)
Reviewed by Rabbi Reuven Chaim
Klein
In this book, Israeli philosopher
Moshe Halbertal presents us with an intellectual biography of the methodologies
and ideas espoused by Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban), also known as
Nachmanides. The first quarter of the book is devoted to explaining Nachmanides'
halachic methodology, and how his approach differed from those of Provencal
scholars in Southern France, the Tosafists in Northern France and Germany, and
Maimonides in Andalusian Spain. The next half of the book comprises an
exposition on Nachmanides’ Kabbalistic ideas and the implications of the
positions he takes, while the final quarter of the book discusses Nachmanides’
view of the reasons behind the commandments.
In elaborating on Nachmanides’ halachic
epistemology, Halbertal contrasts Nachmanides’ approach to “Torah from Sinai”
with the very different approaches of Maimonides and the Geonim. Maimonides
isolates a kernel of Sinaitic revelatory content, and understands the rest of the
halachic corpus as the results of the rabbis’ creative process, as explicitly
endorsed by the Bible. According to Maimonides, the notion of “dispute” (machloket)
stems from different ways of inducing and deducing new conclusions from that
core truth. On the other hand, the Geonim understand the true content of the Sinaitic
Revelation to be somehow lost in transmission, such that "truth" is
defined as that which matches the knowledge given by the Divine at Sinai. The
body of halacha thus comprises of the results of the quest for rediscovering
those lost truths and what they entailed; the Geonim accordingly understand
that machloket comes from different ways of trying to restore the
original Sinaitic truth.
Nachmanides rejects both of those
positions. As Halbertal demonstrates, Nachmanides understands the Sinaitic Revelation
in a broader sense to include all the possible options found within the corpus
of rabbinic tradition, while maintaining that the Torah mandated that the
majority of rabbis in each generation decide which viewpoints—out of a
plurality of multiple legitimate viewpoints—to accept in practice and which, to
reject. In Nachmanides’ view, machloket is built into the system of halacha,
and does not derive from mistaken transmission or a subjective creative
process. As opposed to Maimonides and the Geonim, Nachmanides would say that machloket
is a feature, not a bug.
Throughout his halachic works,
Nachmanides shows great reverence for the Geonim and, especially, for Alfasi.
As a staunch conservative, Nachmanides generally strove to justify and preserve
his predecessors’ rulings, even when he must resort to the innovative mental gymnastics
typified by the Franco-German Tosafists in order to justify those positions. Nachmanides
even penned works to defend Alfasi against the likes of the Baal HaMaor and the
Raavad.
In explaining what drove
Nachmanides to so strongly defend the Geonim and Alfasi’s rulings, Halbertal shows
how Nachmanides used a sort of time-series analysis to introduce a distinction
between Alfasi/Geonim, whom he branded Rishonim ("earlier sages"), versus
Alfasi's students (like Ibn Migash) and grand-students (like Maimonides), whom
he branded Acharonim ("latter-day sages"). Using such temporal
distinctions to grade the authority of different halachic personalities remains
an important tool in the halachic process to this very day.
Halbertal notes that some
scholars argue that Nachmanides' role as a practical halachist informed his
general worldview, and led him to take a more corporeal approach to Jewish eschatology.
In other words, Nachmanides seems to give the human body special significance
by explaining—contra Maimonides—that the Resurrection of the Dead will entail
the soul returning to its body. The argument goes that Nachmanides' scholarship
and prominence in the more "practical" realm of halacha led him to
thinking that the physical body will retain its centrality even in the
post-Messianic Era.
However, Halbertal explicitly disagrees
with this approach, instead preferring to explain that Nachmanides' view of the
significance of the human body stems from his Kabbalistic understanding of the
human body and the human condition as reflecting as sort of Divine Drama played
out in the cosmic cycles that we call history.
Interestingly, Halbertal makes a
point of noting that Nachmanides sides with the Ashkenazic tradition of
identifying “the final boss” to be vanquished in the End of Days as the
Esau-Edomite-Roman-Christian axis. This contrasts with the view taken by
Maimonides and Ibn Ezra that identifies the fourth beast in Daniel’s prophecy
as representing the Ishmael-Islam typology.
In the Kabbalistic sections of
this book, Halbertal dedicates much space to discussion of the perceived
falling-out between the Sefirot of Tiferet and Shekhinah. As
Halbertal understands Nachmanidean eschatology, the final reconciliation of
those two conflicting elements within the so-called Godhead will only take
place in the End of Days. He writes that “the pendulum of history swings from
hardship to salvation and back in tandem with the complex movement between Shekhinah
and Tiferet” (page 222).
In his commentary to the
Pentateuch, Nachmanides famously writes that from God's perspective
"hidden miracles" and "open miracles" are both equally
miraculous, only that the former are less obvious to man because they are
obscured by nature, while the latter are clearly supernatural phenomena.
Halbertal tries to expand on this distinction by arguing that these two sorts
of miracles are rooted in two different Sefirot (Kabbalistic mechanisms
or modalities) by which God operates. After making this argument, he remarks:
"Examining the miracles through a kabalistic lens, however, has afforded
us the additional insight that the two kinds of miracle are profoundly and
metaphysically distinct, and not only observationally so" (page 150).
That said, the heresy inherent in
viewing miracles as the results of a cold, mechanical sefirotic process is that
through such an understanding “God’s voluntary involvement dissipates” (page
156). In fact, this reviewer objects to the usage of the term “Godhead” which
implies that God Himself is comprised of multiple, contradictory traits or
attributes. Those contradictions only exist in man’s perception, but the
metaphysical reality always remains that there is One God, always indivisible
and unchanging (see Mal. 3:6). After all, Judaism is a monotheistic religion.
What Halbertal fails to emphasize in these discussions is that it is precisely
God who created the entire sefirotic structure and who continuously
provides the energy that powers the chain-reactions therein. In order words,
God’s will always remains the starting point from which everything percolates
down into increasingly coarse/physical aspects; the Sefirot are simply
the tools He created to channel His energies in certain ways.
Halbertal continues to clarify Nachmanides’ view of the special divine protection afforded to those righteous men who cleave unto God and to those who live in the Holy Land (which allows them to escape astrological fate and other natural mishaps) . He again explains those phenomena as results of an automatic process of connecting to one Sefirah to escape the effects of another, which harkens back to the Divine drama mentioned above. This essentially pagan understanding downplays the concept of Divine volition and reduces reward/punishment to pawns within a divine game playing out within the Godhead (see page 163–169). Halbertal again uses this model to argue that Nachmanides understands the various levels of prophecy to similarly be the “natural” results of the interplay between different parts of the Divine.
In explaining Nachmanides’ view
of the reason(s) behind the commandments, Halbertal argues that there are two
“unbridgeable” (page 284) layers of understanding. The exoteric approach
presents the commandments as beneficial (in various palpable ways) to the
individual and/or society at large, while the esoteric aspect presents the
commandments as theurgic, or magical, ways of inducing God to reunite the
various sefirot that are in conflict, and consequently shower His
positive influence upon creation. This model deemphasizes the commandments as
an expression of God’s will—a third factor which Nachmanides himself emphasizes
when discussing the Tower of Babel and Golden Calf (which were theurgic in
nature but contravened His will), as well as the Scapegoat (which was also
theurgic, but reflected His divine will).
This book’s final chapter
documents how and why Nachmanides took a middle-of-the-road approach concerning
the controversy behind Kabbalah. Unlike the other pro-Maimonideans of his time,
Nachmanides accepted and embraced Kabbalah; yet, on the other hand, unlike
other contemporary Kabbalists (notably those operating in Gerona), Nachmanides
did not agree that the esoteric teachings of Kabbalah ought to be open to the
public. In striking a happy medium between these approaches, Nachmanides
limited the esoteric content in his own works to a few score Kabbalist
“allusions” in his commentary to the Pentateuch. This showed his allegiance to
the Kabbalist tradition with which he is often associated, but still allowed
him to retain that esoteric tradition as a “secret.”
Nachmanides's legacy continued in
subsequent generations through the Catalonian School, typified by the output of
his students and grand-students, most notably Rashba, Ran, Ritva, and Nimmukei
Yosef. Those scholars are more well-known for their novellae on the Talmud and
Alfasi, but were also accomplished exegetes of Kabbalah and philosophy as well.
In his concluding chapter,
Halbertal summarizes the different schools of thought that flourished in the
thirteenth century and how Nachmanides drew from all of them. Whereas
Nachmanides’ staunch defense of Maimonides might peg Nachmanides as Andalusian,
his acceptance of Kabbalah might associate him more with the Provencal school.
Whereas Nachmanides’ halachic methodology more closely follows that of the
Franco-German Tosafists, his actual rulings reflect the Spanish tradition. These
various cosmopolitan influences on Nachmanides led to Halbertal’s final
analysis in characterizing the great sage as “the first European Jew” (page
320).
While this reviewer quibbles over
the finer details of how to understand certain Kabbalistic aspects in which Nachmanides
engages, the author Moshe Halbertal clearly displays an intimate familiarity
with all of Nachmanides’ written works, plus much of his students’ and
grand-students’ as well. All in all, this book provides the reader with a
much-needed framework for understanding the context of almost everything
Nachmanides ever discusses. Kudos to the translator Daniel Tabak as well for providing
us with an English rendition of Halbertal's work in such a way that coins new
theosophical terminology that can be applied to the study of the Ramban and
beyond.
